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THE RESURRECTION OF HISTORIC USURY
PRINCIPLES FOR CONSUMPTION LOANS IN A
FEDERAL BANKING SYSTEM
John D. Skees'
Lisa Engelkins was a single mother working as a temporary employee,
trying to raise a five-year-old without dependable child support from her
daughter's father.' When she needed extra money to make ends meet,
she went to Urgent Money Services, and after writing a check for $60,
she received $49.41 in cash.2 This soon became her regular method for
paying her bills.' She would write a check to Urgent Money Services,
which the store agreed not to cash for two weeks, and in return for a $300
check, she would immediately receive $255-a $45 fee for the store.4
This decreased her income even further, and as a result, she found
herself needing these payday advance services more often.' In a few
years, she would use these services nineteen times, totaling more than
$1,200 in fees.6
' J.D. Candidate, May 2007, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author wishes to thank Professor William J. Wagner for his invaluable guidance
throughout the writing process and Professor Ralph J. Rohner for sharing his expertise on
the consumer lending industry. Additionally, the author wishes to thank his wife, Sara, for
her patience, support, and understanding. Finally, the author would like to express his
gratitude to Father Michael J. McGivney who taught us that charity toward our neighbors
is always our highest calling.
1. Caitlin Johnson, Nickels, Dimes and Big Bucks, CONNECT FOR KIDS, Jan. 12,
2004, http://www.connectforkids.org/node/533. Lisa is in many ways typical of a payday
loan consumer, as the customer base for payday lending is generally made up of low-to-
moderate income clientele. Creola Johnson, Payday Loans: Shrewd Business or Predatory
Lending?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1, 99 (2002); see also CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, TAMING
THE SHARKS: TOWARDS A CURE FOR THE HIGH-COST CREDIT MARKET 14 (2004)
(quoting a government study as finding the typical customer to be a woman making about
$24,000 a year). There is also evidence that payday lenders target those at the lower end
of the income spectrum, especially welfare recipients and those on fixed incomes. Creola
Johnson, supra, at 100-01. Payday loan borrowers are also much more likely to have filed
for bankruptcy than the national average. Id. at 101-02 (15.4% as compared to 3.7%).




6. Id. Generally the payday loan process works in the following sequence: a
borrower will go to a payday lending outlet with a driver's license, a bank statement, a
telephone bill, proof of employment and income, and a checkbook. Creola Johnson, supra
note 1, at 9. After approving the customer for a loan, the lender will give anywhere from
$50 to $1,000 to the borrower, and in return the customer gives the lender a check for that
amount plus a fee, or alternatively, will require the customer to agree to an automatic
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Yet payday loans, such as Lisa's, despite having a national average
annual percentage rate of 470%,7 are legal as an unintended consequence
of the National Bank Act.8  Congress passed this statute to prevent
discrimination against national banks,9 and with the help of one Supreme
debit of their checking account on the day the loan is due. Id. at 9-10. The loan period is
anywhere up to two weeks because that is roughly the length of the usual pay period. Id.
at 10. At the end of the loan period the borrower can pay the loan "in full" and reclaim
his check, pay a rollover fee, refinance the loan (e.g., basically paying a rollover fee in
states prohibiting them), or the lender can try to cash the borrower's check. Id. Another
option is for the borrower to go to another payday loan company to take out a loan to pay
off the first lender, driving up the cost of the original loan even more. Lynn Drysdale &
Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: The Fringe
Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the Role of Usury Laws in
Today's Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589, 601 (2000). Lisa's story is becoming more and more
common, as more than eight million households now use payday loan services in a year.
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 150 (2004). Overall, the
industry loans about $15 billion annually to desperate consumers. Tasha L. Winebarger,
Note, The Beginning of the End: The Demise of Bank Partnerships with Payday Lenders, 7
N.C. BANKING INST. 317, 317 (2003). All together, pseudo-banking services aimed at
lower-income individuals make a yearly profit of about $5.45 billion. Caitlin Johnson,
supra note 1 (including payday lending, check cashing, rent-to-own, and similar
transactions). The payday loan segment of this industry is growing faster than any other.
Charles A. Bruch, Comment, Taking the Pay Out of Payday Loans: Putting an End to the
Usurious and Unconscionable Interest Rates Charged by Payday Lenders, 69 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1257, 1257 (2001). Payday lending is the most egregious form of subprime lending
because it has serious consequences that do not exist in other forms of subprime lending
such as pawnbroking, title pawns, or rent-to-own agreements; because with those
contracts, the borrower only stands to lose his pawned possession or have his rented
furniture repossessed. Id. at 1273. However, with payday loans, the borrower is liable for
the principal, the interest, and any fees; and he may also have problems if the lender tries
to cash his check. Id.
7. Barr, supra note 6, at 159 tbl.1. A national average APR of 500% has been
postulated by other scholars. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1258. This APR is exorbitant even in
comparison to Mafia loansharks of the 1960s, who typically charged about 250% APR.
PETERSON, supra note 1, at 11. Even higher rates of interest are not unheard of, as one
Indiana payday lender offered a loan of $100 with interest of $20 per day-an APR of
7,300%. Id. Although the payday lending industry claims that Annual Percentage Rates
are not a fair way to evaluate a short-term loan, the fact that a sizeable percentage of
borrowers would roll over their loans demonstrates that these loans are often not short
term at all. Id. at 13.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000).
9. See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, H15 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978), affd sub
nom. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980)); First Nat'l Bank in Mena
v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 880 (8th Cir. 1975); James J. White, The Usury Trompe L'Oeil, 51
S.C. L. REV. 445, 447 (2000). The passage of this law was closely related to the financial
needs of the federal government in the midst of the Civil War. Id. at 450; see also CONG.
GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2132 (1864) (quoting Senator Chandler as supporting a
national banking system because "the people of this nation . . . will stand anything and
everything to sustain their Government at this hour .... I believe it to be the duty of the
Senate to insist upon [a national banking law] in this hour of peril"). This statute was
effective, as it was read to preempt state law usury claims against national banks. See
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Court decision, Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v. First of
Omaha Service Corp.,0 this law has created the legal field in which
payday lenders operate effectively free of state usury limits." This
minimizes the traditional consumer protection role of the states2 and
makes payday lending ever more profitable at the expense of the poor.13
It is increasingly apparent that as usury limits at the state level have been
effectively inoperative,' these businesses are exploiting the financial
vulnerability of their clients." 15
Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003); Evans v. Nat'l Bank of
Savannah, 251 U.S. 108, 114 (1919); Barnet v. Nat'l Bank, 98 U.S. 555, 558 (1879).
10. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299
(1978). This case involved a dispute over § 85, which permitted a national bank from one
state to charge customers in other states an interest rate that would be legal in the bank's
home state, but was higher than the rate allowed in the other states where the bank was
soliciting customers. Id. at 301. A unanimous Court decided that such rate exportation
was permissible under the law. See id. at 313-14.
11. White, supra note 9, at 445; see also Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,026 (proposed Oct. 14, 2005) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pts. 331, 362) [hereinafter Federal Interest Rate Authority] (describing how
Marquette made rate exportation possible); see also White, supra note 9, at 448 (arguing
that "under the Marquette doctrine, the sternest state laws are the first to be undermined
and the quickest to fall"); Winebarger, supra note 6, at 320 (stating that "[slection 85 ...
has emerged as an enabling statute for payday lenders"). Congress would later extend this
same advantage to state banks. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000); White, supra note 9, at 453-
54.
12. See infra Part I.B-C.
13. See Michael Bertics, Note, Fixing Payday Lending: The Potential of Greater Bank
Involvement, 9 N.C. BANKING INST. 133, 136 (2005). Payday lending did not exist before
the early 1990s, but by the year 2000, there were more than 10,000 payday lenders. Id. at
136. The industry, as a whole, profits more than $2 billion a year in fees, making
approximately fifty-five to sixty-nine million payday loans a year, quite impressive for an
industry that did not exist before the first Check Into Cash payday loan store opened in
Tennessee in 1993. Pearl Chin, Note, Payday Loans: The Case for Federal Legislation,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 723, 726 (2004). Indeed, payday lending is "one of the fastest-
growing sectors of the 'fringe banking' industry." Id. at 724. In fact, "'there are now more
payday loan offices in California than McDonald's and Burger King restaurants.'"
PETERSON, supra note 1, at 17 (quoting Damian Paletta, In Brief: Hawke Says Don't
Overlook the 'Underbanked', AM. BANKER, Mar. 19, 2002, at 4). By one estimate, the
industry may grow 600% in the next ten years. Id. at 18.
14. Chin, supra note 13, at 732-33.
15. Creola Johnson, supra note 1, at 5-6. These practices include charging
exorbitantly high interest rates, failing to provide crucial information to borrowers about
the loans, using loan rollovers which trap borrowers in debt, and employing abusive
collection tactics. Id. at 25-26. One particularly harsh method of collection has been to
bring criminal charges against customers for writing bad checks, or threatening to do so,
although the lender knows when the check is written that the customer does not have
enough money in his checking account to cover it. See PETERSON, supra note 1, at 16.
Yet, it is important to note that many borrowers believe these businesses are an important
service. Bertics, supra note 13, at 137. Payday loan borrowers believe that these
companies have two essential advantages for them: (1) the loans can be arranged easily
2006] 1133
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The key practice used by these banks to provide payday loans at
extremely high interest rates is called rent-a-bank, and involves out-of-
state banks partnering with in-state lenders who take advantage of the
legal cover provided by the bank's charter to avoid the usury laws of the
states in which the lending occurs." However, a recent Eleventh Circuit
case, BankWest, Inc. v. Baker,17 provides hope for these consumers by
demonstrating how a correct reading of the preemptive power of federal
banking law enables states to recover their vital role in protecting poor
borrowers like Lisa Engelkins.'
8
Exploitative interest rates have not always been so accepted. Western
civilization, particularly its religious and moral tradition, has long spoken
out against interest rates that enable wealthy lenders to take advantage
of poor borrowers needing consumption loans.' 9  These moral
prohibitions eventually matured into legal prohibitions on usury
lending.20 For someone in Lisa's position, needing a small loan to make
and with minimal hassle; and (2) borrowers believe they have no other viable options. Id.
An Assistant Attorney General in Colorado recently remarked, "[g]iven its unsavory
ancestry, the significant potential for abuse, and the devastating consequences of such
abuse, payday lending demands the strictest of regulation and closest of scrutiny." Paul
Chessin, Borrowing From Peter to Pay Paul: A Statistical Analysis of Colorado's Deferred
Deposit Loan Act, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 387, 423 (2005).
16. Winebarger, supra note 6, at 320-21; see infra Part I.D.2.
17. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and appeal
dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Although the Eleventh
Circuit vacated the initial BankWest opinion as moot because the plaintiff companies were
no longer in the payday lending business, BankWest, 446 F.3d at 1362-63, 1368, the original
opinion suggests a possible return to the traditional understanding of usury laws. See infra
Part III.B.
18. See infra Part 111.
19. See, e.g., ZE'EV W. FALK, HEBREW LAW IN BIBLICAL TIMES 93 (2d ed. 2001)
(describing that under Hebrew law, no interest could be taken on a loan to a fellow
Hebrew); Maria Grazia Mara, Usury, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EARLY CHURCH 856-
57 (Angelo Di Berardino ed., Adrian Walford trans., 1992) (describing the writings of the
early Church Fathers forbidding usury); THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF
CHRISTIANITY 39 (John McManners ed., 1990) (showing the concerns of early Christian
writers who prohibited usury, particularly on lending to the poor who mortgaged their
homes). Later in history, moralists began to outline certain situations in which merchants
could lend at interest, but high interest remained an ethical concern. Id. at 217; see also 1
FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 468 (2d ed. 1968) (explaining that in early common law, usury was considered
immoral, and upon the death of a usurer, all of his chattels were forfeited to the King).
20. See 1 R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 229
(2004) (noting that churches enforced the prohibition on usury within the ecclesiastical
court system). Usury, however, was also considered a temporal crime, and laws passed by
Parliament would bring usury cases into the Crown's courts as well, splitting jurisdiction
over this crime. Id. at 379. The defining moral opinion on the subject of lending money at
interest was that of Gratian, who, in his Decretum, defined usury as any loan made with an
agreement to pay more than what had been lent. Id. at 378.
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ends meet,21 there existed a great deal more legal protection in the yearS 22
1000 than there is today.
This Comment examines the usurious impact of the disappearance of
the legal distinction between lending to the poor and commercial
lending, and what the remedy might be, by first explaining the
commercial lending purposes behind the National Bank Act that started
this trend. Next, this Comment shows the purpose behind state usury
laws, and how these laws fit into the traditional consumer protections
provided by Western governments. Then, it explains how state usury
laws have become nearly irrelevant as an unintended consequence of
federal banking law. Finally, this Comment examines the recent decision
in BankWest, Inc. v. Baker and shows how the Eleventh Circuit correctly
interpreted the preemptive power of federal banking law so as to leave
room for states to fulfill their historic role in protecting consumers from
financial exploitation in the form of payday lending, while still respecting
Congress' valid commercial purpose. This Comment recommends that
(1) states use the preemption analysis of BankWest to enact stricter usury
laws limiting the ability of payday lenders to engage in rent-a-bank
practices, and (2) both the courts and the federal government return to
an understanding of the dual nature of usury implicit in our federal
system and recognize the tradition of borrower protection for
consumption loans that is rooted in our anti-usury tradition.
I. THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF FEDERAL BANKING POLICY
FOR STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS
A. The National Bank Act and Commercial Lending
Acting to improve national commercial lending, Congress passed the
National Bank Act (NBA) of 1863, which allowed national banks to
charge "interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or
District where the bank is located," thus beginning the process of• 23
unintentionally undermining state consumer protections. The intent
21. Lisa's story is disturbingly common. See Bruch, supra note 6, at 1257 (describing
the story of Patrica Turner, who paid $840 in eight months to pay for extensions on a $405
loan without paying down the principal at all); Chin, supra note 13, at 723-24 (relating Pam
Sanson's story, as she ended up paying $900 in interest in six months on an original $375
check); Bertics, supra note 13, at 133 (recounting Sandra Harris' story, as her dependence
on payday loans led to the repossession of her car and wage garnishment).
22. See infra Part I.C.2.
23. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000). Later, 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) would serve the same purpose
for state banks, allowing them to export their rates, equalizing the status of national and
state banks regarding interest rates they could offer to out-of-state customers. BankWest,
Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2004), vacated and appeal dismissed as
moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
20061 1.135
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behind the NBA was to protect national banks from discrimination by
states that chartered their own banks, not to permit banks to evade the
24usury protections of the states.
This statute was a valid exercise of Congress' Commerce Clause
power.25 The NBA was specifically directed at national banks, allowing
them to use the rates "allowed by the laws of the State . . . where the
bank is located. 26  Thus, its intended area of effect was interstate
commerce, the very area in which the Commerce Clause gave Congress
the power to act.27 The Commerce Clause was intended to "'empower[]
Congress to regulate commerce[, and therefore] the States necessarily
surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way
of such regulation."'28 By regulating the rates that banks could charge in
interstate lending, Congress acted at the very core of its constitutional
authority. 9
Congress' dual purpose in passing this statute was to help finance the
Civil War and to allow nationally chartered banks to compete equally
with state-chartered banks, not to interfere with state consumer• 30
protections. Congress feared that if it could not ensure parity for
national banks, it would cripple the ability of national banks to serve
their purpose. 3' However, the NBA ensured parity between state and
24. White, supra note 9, at 447; see also Federal Interest Rate Authority, supra note
11, at 60,025 (describing how the purpose behind the NBA was to prevent discrimination
against national banks).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. t, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress the power "[tjo regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes").
26. 12 U.S.C. § 85.
27. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199-200 (1824).
28. Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
683 (1999) (quoting Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192
(1964)).
29. See Schlesinger v. Gilhooly, 81 N.E. 619, 624-25 (N.Y. 1907) ("Having the power
to create national banks, it had the power to strengthen them by a general rule, operative
in all the states, and to protect them from the varying policies of the different states with
reference to the subject of usury, which otherwise might undermine their solvency and
destroy their usefulness in certain localities.").
30. See Roper v. Consurve, Inc., 578 F.2d 1106, 1115 n.9 (5th Cir. 1978), affd sub
nom., Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980) (finding that the purpose of
the NBA was "to place national banks on a plane of competitive equality with other
lenders in respective states by adopting state law with respect to permissible interest
rates"); White, supra note 9, at 450 (discussing the relationship between the NBA and
Civil War financing).
31. Schlesinger, 81 N.E. at 625 (reasoning that if states could limit the interest rates of
national banks more strictly than state banks, "[s]uch an act necessarily impairs the
capacity of the bank to act in the ordinary course of business without great danger[;] [i]t
hinders when there should be freedom, and destroys when there should be safety").
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national banks, favoring neither in competition for loans.32 By creating
this equality, Congress protected national banks from discrimination33
and encouraged interstate lending,3 4 just the sort of increased interstate
commerce that motivated the Founders to give the interstate commerce
power to the national government. 5 As Senator Sumner said during the
debates on the NBA:
The financial enterprise that has been begun must be finished
and protected .... If the system is to be maintained, if it is not
to be utterly abandoned, it must be placed under the most
favorable auspices, so at least that it may not fail from any want
of care on our part .... For this reason I shall vote to keep it
free from all State hostility or even State rivalry.36
B. State Usury Protections for Consumption Borrowers
Most states still have usury laws that, at least theoretically, limit
interest that lenders may charge on a payday loan.37 Several states have
no consumer protections for payday loans,3s but the majority of states
specifically allow payday lending with stated interest rate limitations,
although those rates can be quite high or nonexistent.39 On the other
32. First Nat'l Bank in Mena v. Nowlin, 509 F.2d 872, 879 (8th Cir. 1975) (discussing
the legislative history of the statute). As the FDIC has recently recognized, under the
NBA and its interpretation by the Supreme Court, "it has become well established that
national banks are generally permitted to charge the highest interest rates permitted for
any competing state lender by the laws of the state where the national bank is located."
Federal Interest Rate Authority, supra note 11, at 60,026.
33. United Mo. Bank of Kansas City v. Danforth, 394 F. Supp. 774, 779 (W.D. Mo.
1975). Because of the National Bank Act, states could not give state banks any
advantages over national banks. Id.
34. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2123-24 (1864) (discussing the
possibility of creating more capital investment through standardizing interstate interest
rates). As Senator Chandler remarked, the committee that proposed the bill "knew very
well what they were preparing. They were preparing a national banking law." Id. at 2132.
35. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 123 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Books
1982) (1787-88) (stating that "there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade
or finance that more strongly demands a Federal superintendence" than an interstate
commerce power). Hamilton believed that different limits on trade in each state were a
serious barrier to trade and the economic improvement of the United States. See id. at
123-24.
36. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2130 (1864).
37. White, supra note 9, at 445.
38. See JEAN ANN Fox, CONSUMER FED'N OF AM., UNSAFE AND UNSOUND:
PAYDAY LENDERS HIDE BEHIND FDIC BANK CHARTERS TO PEDDLE USURY 30 (2004),
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfstpdlrentabankreport.pdf (naming New Mexico and
Wisconsin).
39. See id. at 30 (naming Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio,
2006] 1137
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hand, many states have tried to make payday lending illegal, oftenS 40
through interest rate limitations. Thus, the vast majority of states
provide some sort of interest rate-based limitation on these lending
practices, even though some limits are very high 4
State usury limits provide a unique service to citizens of these states,
limiting the terms of a contract between private parties with the intent of
preventing interest rates that are per se too high.42 The purpose of these
state statutes "is to protect those whom necessity compels to borrow
against the outrageous demands oftentimes made and required by those
who have money to loan. , 3 If a contract is found to be usurious, a court
may cancel" or void the loan.45 Additionally, the court might enjoin the
lender from enforcing the loan against the borrower, or permit the
borrower to recover the amount of usurious interest already paid in the
course of the loan, possibly with punitive damages. 47 Thus, usury statutes
serve an important consumer protection function, pursuant to the police
41power of the states, while also advancing significant public policy goals.
For example, the District of Columbia usury statute provides that "the
parties to an instrument in writing for the payment of money at a future
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia).
40. See Creola Johnson, supra note 1, at 29; Fox, supra note 38, at 29 (naming as the
jurisdictions that attempt to prohibit payday lending through rate limitations, usury laws,
and specific restrictions on payday lenders: Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin
Islands).
41. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Fogie v. THORN Ams., Inc., 95 F.3d 645, 649 (8th Cir. 1996); Hamilton
v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953, 955 (E.D. Ky. 1997) (order denying motion to dismiss) (stating
that a usury claim requires the lender to knowingly charge an interest rate greater than
permitted by statute); see also Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103, 111 (1833) (stating
that "acts against usury were intended to protect the needy").
43. First Nat'l Bank of Ada v. Phares, 174 P. 519, 520 (Okla. 1918) (per curiam).
44. See, e.g., Hilal v. Lipton, 642 N.Y.S.2d 78, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (order
granting motion for summary judgment) (applying equitable remedies to void a usurious
contract).
45. See, e.g., Focus Inv. Assocs. v. Am. Title Ins. Co., 992 F.2d 1231, 1240 (1st Cir.
1993) (stating that usury voids a contract under the applicable state law); Tinter v. Sack,
646 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (order granting motion for summary
judgment) (describing voidability if a contract was criminally usurious).
46. See, e.g., Fogie, 95 F.3d at 654.
47. See, e.g., Bryson v. Bramlett, 321 S.W.2d 555, 556-57 (Tenn. 1958).
48. See, e.g., Fogie, 95 F.3d at 654 (demonstrating the close connection between usury
and consumer protection interest as part of a state's public policy); Bynum v. Equitable
Mortgage Group, No. 99 CV 2266-SBC-JMF, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6363, *2-3 (D.D.C.
Apr. 7, 2005) (mem.) (demonstrating how closely usury statutes and consumer protection
statutes are intertwined).
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time may contract therein for the payment of interest on the principal
amount thereof at a rate not exceeding 24% per annum, 4 9 although
loans of more than $1,000 are exempt if they satisfy other conditions.0
Through this statute, D.C. law protects small borrowers who need less
than $1,000, such as those seeking small consumption loans for a short
period of time," by limiting the possible interest rate lenders may charge
to a very low percentage compared to the national average for payday
lending." This desire to protect debtors from otherwise legal, yet
exploitative, contracts is also shown by D.C.'s limitation on interest in
oral contracts to only 6% annually. 3 As implicitly recognized in the D.C.
usury statute, this consumer protection role is an essential part of a
state's traditional authority to protect its citizens from overreaching by
lenders. 4
49. D.C. CODE § 28-3301(a) (2001).
50. Id. § 28-3301(d)(1).
51. The average payday loan is for about $300. Maureen Rooney, Legal Loan
Sharks, CREDIT INFOCENTER, Feb. 2002, http://www.creditinfocenter.com/loans/legalloan
shark.shtml.
52. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
53. D.C. CODE § 28-3303(1).
54. See BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1314 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that "[u]sury laws are an exercise of the historic police powers of the states"), vacated and
appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Varr v. Olimpia,
No. H021157, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6155, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 1, 2002)
(stating that "usury law is within the state's historic police powers, an area of traditional
state regulation"); see also Lindquist v. Xerox Corp., 571 F. Supp. 470, 472 (D.V.I. 1983)
(order granting motion to dismiss) (explaining how a legislature can limit the usury
defense through an exercise of its police power); cf United States v. Fox, 6 C.M.R. 533,
536 (C.M.A. 1952) (explaining how in the military, as in the states, usury is a valid exercise
of the government's police power).
2006] 1139
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C. State Usury Laws Reflect the Traditional Consumer Protection Duties
of Governments Apparent in Our Legal and Moral Tradition5
1. Biblical and Early Christian Usury Precepts56
Usury laws, such as the current state laws discussed supra, are rooted
in the morals of the Old Testament.57 Under Hebrew law, a lender was
expected to lend money as an act of charity rather than as an interest-
producing investment. 5' The righteous in the Old Testament have a dutyto protect and care for the poor and needy, not to profit from their
55. The analysis in this Comment is unusual, in that it takes seriously the
understanding that our legal history, even before the common law, is relevant to the
application of law today. Our own legal tradition has grown out of much of what came
before it, thus, this Comment will examine current usury law in light of that history to
demonstrate the moral heritage that we have lost. This approach is appropriate because
there is nothing unique or extraordinary about the marketplace, such as the market for
consumer loans, that prevents it from being critiqued on a theological basis. RAYMOND
PLANT, POLITICS, THEOLOGY AND HISTORY 180 (2001). Theology, if taken seriously,
applies not only to what is ecclesiastical or divine, but also to what is secular and concrete
as well. See id. Indeed, to think that "markets can[] somehow be bracketed off from the
moral realm and treated as autonomous entities" would be illogical to a religious person.
See id. See generally PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF
GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY (2002) (demonstrating that the view that religion and morality
are critical to all aspects of life has become even more common in much of the world as
traditional religion becomes a more vibrant force in many countries). Religiously-based
morality is relevant to the marketplace precisely because "[m]arkets raise basic questions
about the nature of value, about the character of human goods and the nature of human
motivation, and thus form part of a public world to which religious belief can address
itself." PLANT, supra, at 193. Even today, the writing on consumer credit protection and
usury law is infused with ideas of morality. See Paul B. Rasor, Biblical Roots of Modern
Consumer Credit Law, 10 J. L. & RELIGION 157, 173 (1993-94).
56. Although this Comment is limited to a discussion of the Judeo-Christian
tradition, out of which grew the common law tradition, it is important to note that the
Hindu, Buddhist, and Islamic traditions have all been critical of usury. See Wayne A.M.
Visser & Alastair McIntosh, A Short Review of the Historical Critique of Usury, reprinted
in HISTORY OF USURY PROHIBITION (1998), available at http://www.alastairmcintosh.
com/articles/1998_usury.htm.
57. See Rasor, supra note 55, at 158 (explaining that our current consumer credit laws
reflect many of the same moral and religious concerns found in the Bible and its legal
codes). Usury laws are also apparent in sources outside any particular religious tradition,
as seen in laws from the Roman Republic around 340 B.C., which made any form of
interest illegal. Visser & McIntosh, supra note 56.
58. FALK, supra note 19, at 93. However, while under strict Hebrew law no interest
could be taken on a loan unless it was a loan made to a foreigner, as time passed, this
provision was largely ignored. Id. If a loan was unpaid, on the other hand, it appears that
a debtor could be seized to labor until the debt was paid off, or children could be given as
payment; in any case, the creditor would have to release him in the seventh year. Id. at 93-
95.
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misfortune. 9 This is particularly evident in Ezekiel, in which the law
against interest was interwoven with the laws of charity, purity, and
religious duty for the Jewish people.6°
The policy regarding the moral nature of lending reflects one of the
core concerns of Old Testament writings on usury: lending at interest was
a practice motivated by greed that allowed wealthier lenders to amass
greater wealth at the expense of oppressing the poor." Leviticus, in
particular, reflects the concern that charging interest on a loan is hurtful
to the poor, encouraging Hebrews to maintain their "kin [who] fall into
difficulty" even though they cannot pay for it, and to take no interest on
any assistance that they give to them;62 usury prohibitions were necessary
59. Rasor, supra note 55, at 164-65. Indeed, the regulations on lending in the Bible
were "part of a larger group of... humanitarian laws which were intended to protect the
most vulnerable classes of society, especially widows, orphans, aliens, and the poor,
including debtors." Id. at 164.
60. Ezekiel 18:5-9. Ezekiel says:
If a man is righteous and does what is lawful and right-if he does not eat upon
the mountains or lift up his eyes to the idols of the house of Israel, does not defile
his neighbor's wife or approach a woman during her menstrual period, does not
oppress anyone, but restores to the debtor his pledge, commits no robbery, gives
his bread to the hungry and covers the naked with a garment, does not take
advance or accrued interest, withholds his hand from iniquity, executes true
justice between contending parties, follows my statutes, and is careful to observe
my ordinances, acting faithfully-such a one is righteous; he shall surely live, says
the Lord GOD.
Id.
61. T.F. Divine, Usury, in 14 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 498 (1967). This
teaching was in accord with that of ancient Greek philosophers, such as Plato, who saw
usury as a form of class conflict that was dangerous to the state, and Aristotle who
condemned the usurer as "guilty of injustice, pettiness, and illiberality." Id. This
philosophy is reflected in Exodus, which states: "If you lend money to my people, to the
poor among you, you shall not deal with them as a creditor; you shall not exact interest
from them." Exodus 22:25. In this way, these prohibitions on usury focused on the plight
of the debtor, toward whom the lender was called on to show compassion. Rasor, supra
note 55, at 165.
62. Leviticus 25:36. Leviticus reads:
Do not take interest in advance or otherwise make a profit from [your kin], but
fear your God; let them live with you. You shall not lend them your money at
interest taken in advance, or provide them food at a profit. I am the LORD your
God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt, to give you the land of Canaan,
to be your God. If any who are dependent on you become so impoverished that
they sell themselves to you, you shall not make them serve as slaves. They shall
remain with you as hired or bound laborers. They shall serve with you until the
year of the jubilee. Then they and their children with them shall be free from
your authority; they shall go back to their own family and return to their
ancestral property.
Leviticus 25:36-41. Both Exodus and Leviticus appear to apply only in cases of loans to
the poor. Visser & McIntosh, supra note 56. These moral precepts are also confirmed in
the Psalms, where the man who shall "abide in [the Lord's] tent" is characterized, in part,
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to protect the basic survival of the debtor. As a whole, the Old
Testament understanding of usury reflects a concern for the potential
exploitation of the poor by the wealthy through usury,64 primarily as a
way of preventing poverty.65
The New Testament does not contain the same explicit prohibitions on66
usury. However, the early Church Fathers drew on Old Testament
as one "who do[es] not lend [his] money at interest," promising that "[hie who do[es]
these things shall never be moved." Psalm 15:1-5. These Jewish laws marked a major
departure from general practices in the ancient world at that time, where interest rates of
20% to 50% were common. J.E. Hartley, Debt, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
BIBLE ENCYCLOPEDIA 905 (Geoffrey W. Bromiley ed., 1979). Yet, even in Old
Testament Israel, indebtedness remained a recurring problem, and many prophets
criticized the lending practices of the wealthy that often led to the enslavement of fellow
Jews. Id. at 905-06. However, the law did allow lending at interest to foreigners.
Deuteronomy 23:20. This allowance in Deuteronomy reads:
You shall not charge interest on loans to another Israelite, interest on money,
interest on provisions, interest on anything that is lent. You may charge interest,
but on loans to another Israelite, you may not charge interest, so that the LORD
your God may bless you in all your undertakings in the land you are about to
enter and possess.
Deuteronomy 23:19-20. This text extends the prohibition on usury to any sort of lending,
not just to the poor, although transactions with non-Jews are exempted. Visser &
McIntosh, supra note 56.
63. Rasor, supra note 55, at 190 (stating that Biblical usury laws protected the
"debtor's basic necessities from ... overreaching or advantage-taking" by lenders). The
strong line that the scriptural authorities take against usury could reflect the fact that the
biblical law was designed to operate in an agrarian society where commercial loans were
effectively non-existent, leaving only loans made for consumption, which would have been
sought only by the poor who needed money to avoid going hungry. Hartley, supra note
62, at 905.
64. See Nehemiah 5:1-13 (describing where the prophet condemns wealthy
landowners who had taken mortgages on the fields, vineyards, and houses of poor Jews
who had borrowed money in order to pay the tax that the King had levied on their lands).
Nehemiah confronts the wealthy lenders for exacting interest from those who had
borrowed, demanding that they "stop this taking of interest [and] [r]estore to them ...
their fields, their vineyards, their olive orchards, and their houses." Nehemiah 5:10-11.
The practice of lending among Jews during the time of the Old Testament indicates that it
was not widely punished as a matter of criminal law, but was instead primarily considered
a moral shortcoming. Visser & McIntosh, supra note 56.
65. Hartley, supra note 62, at 905; Rasor, supra note 55, at 168. As one scholar has
noted, the fundamental characteristic of Biblical usury principles was that the vulnerable
should be protected from exploitation by lenders. Id. at 190.
66. Mara, supra note 19, at 856. But see Matthew 25:14-30 for the "Parable of the
Talents," where the master condemns the servant who hid the talent he had been given,
telling the servant he should have "invested my money with the bankers, and on my return
I would have received what was my own with interest." This seems to indicate an
acceptance of commercial lending and investment during the time of Jesus, but not lending
for consumption. Compare Luke 19:23 (describing Jesus' parable about the servant who
hid rather than investing the money his master had entrusted to him: "[wihy then did you
not put my money into the bank? Then when I returned, I could have collected it with
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texts to argue that usury was not compatible with Christian life67 or
consistent with the Jewish tradition.68 These early Christian theologians
condemned usury as contrary to the Christian duty to love the poor
because the real intent of the usurer is to take advantage of his neighbor,
leaving him poorer than before. 9 In fact, Ambrose came close to a total
condemnation of usury under all circumstances. 70 For these moralists,
interest."), with Hartley, supra note 62, at 906 (describing the criticisms Jesus made of the
Pharisees who used their positions to maximize their own wealth). Augustine, in
interpreting the Old Testament prohibitions on usury, bridged the gap between the Old
Testament and Christianity, comparing the Old Testament understanding of usury to a
minor sin, which he claimed would be easy for the Christian to avoid because "people who
are incapable of even [avoiding usurious transactions and other sins] are much less able to
speak the truth in their hearts, to refrain from practicing deceit with their tongues, to
profess the truth outwardly just as it is in their hearts." SAINT AUGUSTINE, EXPOSITION
OF PSALM 14, reprinted in THE WORKS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE: A TRANSLATION FOR THE
21ST CENTURY 179-80 (John E. Rotelle ed., Maria Boulding trans., 2000). The link
between the old Jewish law and Christianity was also apparent in his preaching on the
Psalms where he wrote: "How do we know God does not want it in this case? Because it is
written elsewhere, He has not put his money out to usury [referring to Psalm 14(15)]. And
I think that usurers themselves know how loathsome, how hateful and abominable the
practice is." SAINT AUGUSTINE, EXPOSITION 3 OF PSALM 36, reprinted in THE WORKS
OF SAINT AUGUSTINE: A TRANSLATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 129, 133 (John E.
Rotelle ed., Maria Boulding trans., 2000).
67. Cf Hartley, supra note 62, at 906. The New Testament introduces a new
theological concept relating to debt, namely that while it is permissible to lend at interest,
the Christian "is now under obligation to the greater principle of mercy." Id. He can lend
at interest, but he has what is generally a more stringent limitation on his lending than in
the Old Testament because he must lend justly, "follow[ing] just business practices within
the existing economic system." Id. There is a Christian duty of stewardship to all creation
of being generous and merciful. Id.; see also Luke 16:1-9 (describing the parable of the
prudent steward).
68. See Mara, supra note 19, at 856. This tradition was not always followed, and
indeed, early Christian clergy lent money to Christian merchants, much the same way that
pagan temples acted as banks. THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY,
supra note 19, at 39. The Council of Nicaea in 325 limited the permissible interest rate for
these loans from clerics to merchants to 12% a year, much lower than the typical
commercial rate. Id.
69. Mara, supra note 19, at 856. This belief is reflected in the writings of Commodian,
Lactantius, and Hilary of Poitiers in particular. Id. Furthermore, practicing usury denies
freedom to the poor. Id. at 857 (citing the writings of Basil). Gregory of Nyssa was
particularly adamant, criticizing the usurer as a thief who increases the number of those
living in poverty. Id.
70. See id. at 857 (citing Augustine's writings De Nabuthe, De Bono Mortis, and De
Tobia). This would be echoed by John Chrysostom, Jerome, Augustine, and Leo the
Great. Id. Cyprian saw avoiding usury as one of the many varied duties of the Christian.
CYPRIAN, TREATISE III: SCRIPTURE TESTIMONIES AGAINST THE JEWS, reprinted in THE
TREATISES OF CYPRIAN 21, 67 (London, Oxford 1839). The command "[t]hat we must
not take usury," is inserted between the teaching "[t]hat it comes from our sin and
deservings that we are troubled, and do not feel the help of God in all things," and "[tihat
even enemies are to be beloved." Id. at 67 paras. 47-49.
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usury represented a contrast with the Christian duties of charity and
mercy; usury was evil both in its origin and effect-greed leading to the
exploitation of the poor."
For early Christians, the benefit of usury law was its ability to protect
the desperately poor from exploitation when they had nowhere else to
go.72 In this moral tradition, usury was not an honest business transaction
because the purpose of lending at interest was to take advantage of your
neighbor.13  Yet, this criticism of usury lending to the poor was
distinguished from the general allowance of commercial lending by
Christians, as early in Christian history, clerics could morally lend money
to Christian merchants. 4
2. Usury Regulation in the Middle Ages and at Early Common Law
The moral condemnation of usury reached its peak in the later Middle
Ages,75 when the Church Councils of the twelfth, thirteenth, and
71. Divine, supra note 61, at 499. Gregory of Nyssa saw usury as a form of
oppression of the poor, a sin against Christian justice and charity:
The destitute person is making supplication and is seated outside your door; in
his need he seeks your wealth to bring relief. However, you do just the opposite
and turn him into an adversary. You fail to assist him and free him from necessity
while you indulge in personal wealth. Furthermore, you sow evils in this afflicted
wretch, remove the clothes from his nakedness, cause him harm and heap one
care and grief upon another. Whoever takes money from the practice of usury
secures a pledge of poverty and brings harm upon his home through a superficial
good deed.
CASIMIR MCCAMBLEY, Against Those Who Practice Usury by Gregory of Nyssa, 36
GREEK ORTHODOX THEOLOGICAL REVIEW 287 (1991). For Gregory of Nyssa, usury
was a form of false charity where the wealthy pretends to lend to a man in need, but really
does so only for his own material benefit: "Usury opts for a convenient form of destitution
in order to have money as a constantly toiling slave. In this manner moneylending obtains
what it has lent out." Id. at 296. He asks of the Christian, "[a]re you not aware that the
need for a loan is a request for mercy cheerfully bestowed?" Id. at 298. Indeed, according
to Saint Basil, the pain of the debtor is like the pain of a mother in childbirth "because of
the anguish and distress which it is accustomed to produce in the souls of the borrowers."
Id. at 289 (citation omitted).
72. Divine, supra note 61, at 498.
73. Mara, supra note 19, at 856.
74. THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY, supra note 19, at 39.
75. See id. at 106-07 (describing the strict interpretation of usury prohibition during
the time of Charlemagne when usury, particularly in the form of profiteering on corn
during times of famine, was considered to be against the example set by King David and
other Old Testament kings who believed they should protect the poor from abuse,
including unnecessarily high prices). The people of Charlemagne's time believed that God
would punish a society that permitted usury, possibly through famine. Id. The Capitulary
of Thionville exemplifies this fear of divine punishment because of usury, stating:
When famine or plague occurs, men should not wait for our edict but should
staightaway pray to God for his mercy; as to scarcity of food in this present year,
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fourteenth centuries forbade the taking of usury by anyone. The final
triumph of anti-usury teaching would come when Pope Urban III
interpreted Luke 6:35 to forbid usury altogether, proclaiming that the
intention to benefit by the lending of money by itself was usurious.77
Pope Urban III's teaching was an interpretation of the words of Christ
himself, and became widely influential.8
In the Middle Ages, this strict prohibition against usury was mainly a
form of consumer credit protection because most people had no means
to protect themselves from unpredictable events such as famine, war, or
fire that could destroy their livelihood.7 9  Usury laws attempted to
respond to the economic insecurity brought about by the commercial• 80
revolution. Yet, as time passed, commercial loans were usually not
considered usurious, but instead were considered an investment, whereas
let each man help his own people as best he can, and not sell his corn at too high
a price.
Id. at 107. The Hadriana, a collection of Church laws from this time, included a letter by
Pope Leo the Great that forbade usury by clerics and considered it sinful for the laity, but
the capitularies of Charlemagne took this even further, outlawing usury by anyone. JOHN
T. NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIC ANALYSIS OF USURY 15 (1957).
76. Divine, supra note 61, at 499. The Second Lateran Council forbade all usury.
NOONAN, supra note 75, at 18. The Synod of Pavia was the first council to proclaim a
punishment of excommunication for usurers and require restitution. Id. at 16. The Third
Lateran Council, in addition to excommunication, made manifest usurers ineligible for a
Christian burial, and forbade churches from taking donations from them. Id, at 19. The
development of usury teaching was gradual, from the early Church Councils that had
forbidden usury only by clerics, to the ninth century when usury began to be prohibited to
the laity as well. JOHN GILCHRIST, THE CHURCH AND ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE
MIDDLE AGES 63 (1969). Although those Fathers were writing in a time when the typical
economic activity was subsistence farming, and because the European economy had not
changed much between the Roman Empire and the medieval period, there was no
economic impetus for a change in usury doctrine, and the theologians of the time held
them in high regard. Id. at 62.
77. NOONAN, supra note 75, at 19-20. This section of the Gospel of Luke reads:
If you lend money to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to
you? Even sinners lend to sinners, to receive as much again. But, love your
enemies, do good, and lend, expecting nothing in return. Your reward will be
great, and you will be children of the Most High; for he is kind to the ungrateful
and the wicked. Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful.
Luke 6:34-36.
78. NOONAN, supra note 75, at 19-20. As Noonan shows, by the High Middle Ages,
basic accepted principles on usury law included that "(1) Usury is whatever is demanded
in return in a loan beyond the loaned good itself; (2) the taking of usury is a sin prohibited
by the Old and New Testaments; (3) the very hope of a return beyond the good itself is
sinful." Id. at 20.
79. GILCHRIST, supra note 76, at 63-64.
80. Id. at 64.
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emergency loans to the poor, who represented a higher risk to lenders
81
because of their insecurity, remained the focus of usury laws.
This traditional moral understanding of usury would come to influence
82
the formation of the common law tradition . In England, the strong
prohibition of usury is apparent in that usurers were excommunicated
ipso facto,s3 and were required to make restitution for their offense
before the Church would lift this ban.84 Yet, over time, the English law
came to distinguish between high and low rates of interest; the
Elizabethan usury laws only provided for punishment in cases where the
interest rate exceeded 10%, effectively allowing interest rates of less than
81. Id. at 64-65. Thus, the poor were the primary focus of usury protections because
they represented the highest risk, and therefore would suffer the highest rates, but because
of their low economic condition, they could ill afford to do without the consumer credit
protection that usury laws afforded. Id. at 63-65.
82. See THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETIr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
423 (4th ed. 1948) (demonstrating how the church tribunals held jurisdiction over usurers
during the time of the early common law). Usury appears to have been considered in a
class of moral issues in which the English church had a particular interest. 1 HELMHOLZ,
supra note 20, at 229 ("Ecclesiastical jurisdiction between parties embraced instance
litigation over marriage and divorce, succession at death, tithes and other ecclesiastical
dues, defamation, breach of faith or perjury, rights to ecclesiastical property, usury,
assaults on the clergy, and ecclesiastical pensions."). In fact, the ecclesiastical court
records from the early common law period refer to usury as a crime. Id. at 600.
83. 1 HELMHOLZ, supra note 20, at 378. In England, usury was an economic offense
that continued to be considered sinful, and a breach of Christian morality. See 1 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 130. The religious and moral nature of usury regulation is
reflected in understanding the Jews' role in money lending in England, where they could
lend money at interest. Id. at 468-71; see also Leviticus 25:35-36 (explaining how Jews
were prohibited from taking interest on loans to fellow Jews); Deuteronomy 23:19-20
(explaining that it was acceptable to take interest on loans to non-Jews). This theological
happenstance created a unique position for Jews in England, where they began to handle
the monetary business of the King, who, in theory, owned everything that belonged to
them. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 468-69. This relationship led to some
of the early English anti-Semitism, as one historian explains, perhaps reflecting some of
the prejudices of his time:
[P]erhaps they would have been accused of crucifying children and occasionally
massacred; but they would not have been so persistently hated as they were, had
they not been made the engines of royal indigence. From the middle of the
thirteenth century onwards the king was compelled to rob them of their
privileges, to forbid them to hold land, to forbid them even to take interest. This
last prohibition could not be carried into effect; there was little or nothing that
the Jews could profitably do if they were cut off from lending money. Their
expulsion in 1290 looks like the only possible solution of a difficult problem.
Id. at 471 (footnote omitted).
84. 1 HELMHOLZ, supra note 20, at 378. As a consequence of a successful
prosecution a usurer was forced to pay back the part of a loan payment that was usurious.
Id. at 618. An additional punishment was often in the form of a "penitential event"
whereby a usurer was required to demonstrate public remorse for his actions. See id. at
589.
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10%.85 This reflected the actual practice of English courts, which had
come to allow moderate interest rates.86 However, even as some interest
rates became acceptable, the courts paid little attention to commercial
loans at interest, instead concerning themselves mainly with smaller
loans, likely of the consumption type. 7 Undoubtedly, large commercial
loans did occur, 88 but it appears that they were not a major concern of the
legal authorities, most likely because they were investment-type loans,
not the consumption loans that were the concern of the moral tradition.8 9
3. The Dual Nature of Usury
By understanding the history of usury laws and their consumer
protection purposes, it becomes apparent that usury is far more complex
than the current simplistic definition given by many authorities. 90
Something has been lost between the traditional, dual-level
understanding of usury and Black's Law Dictionary, which defines all
usury as "the charging of an illegal rate of interest" or, alternatively,
"[a]n illegally high rate of interest," making no distinction between
commercial loans and consumption loans.9' This lack of understanding
for the nuance of usury is also reflected more widely in our legal
culture.92 Understanding this disconnect between our tradition and our
85. Id. at 381.
86. Id. Many lenders avoided the charge of usury through a number of legal
subterfuges. Id. One method of avoiding usury laws was through a mortgage called a gage
where the creditor received profits from the land for a period of time, but the profits from
the land did not pay down the principal debt. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 119 (2d ed. 1996). Another
common law development that served as a way of getting around the prohibition on usury
was the term of years, in which the usurer paid a lump sum in return for the revenues from
the land for a certain number of years. PLUCKNETr, supra note 82, at 541. In this
situation, the term would be long enough for the usurer to turn a profit, but because it
only involved selling a lease for a lump sum, the "termor" could escape a charge of usury.
Id. Critics have characterized this as "a speculative arrangement ... made between a
grasping money-lender on the one hand, and on the other a man whose difficulties
temporarily compel him to part with his patrimony." id.
87. See 1 HELMHOLZ, supra note 20, at 381-82. For example, the largest loan
attacked as usurious in the English courts was a little over £24. Id. at 381.
88. See id.
89. GILCHRIST, supra note 76, at 64-65.
90. See discussion supra Part I.C.1-2. As shown supra, a review of the history of
usury laws, both their moral underpinnings and their legal and practical implementation,
demonstrates that there has always been more than one understanding of usury: on the
one hand, there was usury as applied to commercial loans between merchants or
businessmen, and on the other hand, there was usury as applied to consumer loans for
persons in emergency situations. Id.
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1543 (7th ed. 1999).
92. 45 AM. JUR. 2D Interest and Usury § 84 (1999) (laying out the four requirements
of usury: (1) that there be a loan or forbearance of something valuable; (2) that there be
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current understanding helps explain how the unintended flaws in the
interaction between federal banking law and state usury efforts came
about.93
D. The Modern Trend in Interest-Rate Regulation94
1. Marquette and the NBA's Consequences for State Usury Limits
The first evidence that the federal purpose behind the NBA had
become distorted began in Marquette National Bank of Minneapolis v.
First of Omaha Service Corp. as a dispute over credit card interest rates.9
The Supreme Court was called on to decide "whether the National Bank
Act ... authorize[d] a national bank based in one State to charge its out-
of-state credit-card customers an interest rate on unpaid balances
allowed by its home State, when that rate is greater than that permitted
by the State of the bank's nonresident customers."% Omaha Bank, the
defendant, was a national bank with a Nebraska charter, and as part of its
financial services, attempted to issue credit cards to Minnesota
residents.97 Because Omaha Bank operated under Nebraska law, it
charged Nebraska interest rates, which were higher than the interest
rates permitted under Minnesota law. 9 Marquette National Bank sued
to have Omaha Bank prohibited from soliciting Minnesota customers for
credit cards that used higher interest rates than were legal under
Minnesota law.99
an agreement that the full amount loaned will be repaid; (3) that the lender make more
profit on the loan than is legal; and (4) that the lender have the intent to break the law).
Nowhere in this definition is the historical distinction between consumption and
commercial loans under usury laws acknowledged. See id.
93. See discussion infra Part I.D.
94. The conflict between the National Bank Act and consumer protections did not
arise until more than a century after passage of the Act. Although the reasons for this are
not clear, it may be due to the fact that interstate consumption lending would have been
much harder before technological advances in the mid-twentieth century made credit
cards and other types of consumer loans more widespread. See White, supra note 9, at
447.
95. Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S.
299, 301 (1978); see also White, supra note 9, at 451.
96. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 301.
97. Id. at 301-02.
98. Id. at 302. Omaha Bank charged 18% interest on the first $999.99 of an unpaid
credit card balance, and 12% interest on any unpaid credit card balance of $1,000 and
above; such high interest rates would not have been permitted under Minnesota law,
which set the APR on unpaid credit card balances at 12% for all amounts. Id.
99. Id. at 304. The state trial court granted partial summary judgment to the
plaintiffs, holding that the Minnesota usury statutes were not preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 85,
which allowed national banks to use the rates allowed in their home states for out-of-state
customers. Id. at 306. The court, therefore, granted an injunction that would have
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A unanimous Supreme Court found that Omaha Bank was a national
bank for purposes of the statute, and therefore, "[t]he interest rate that
Omaha Bank may charge in its [credit card] program is thus governed by
federal law."' Because § 85 of Title 12 U.S.C. permits a national bank
to charge rates based on the laws of the state in which it is located, the
Court determined that Omaha Bank was located in Nebraska for
purposes of the statute.' 1 The Court reasoned that "Omaha Bank
cannot be deprived of this location merely because it is extending credit
to residents of a foreign State," and it could therefore export Nebraska
rates. 102
The Court rejected Marquette National Bank's argument that
Congress' intent was to equalize competition between state and national
banks,' 3 and that with rate exportation, the "competitive equality now
existing between state and national banks" would be upset' 4, Finally, in
prevented Omaha Bank from soliciting credit card customers in Minnesota to use a card
that charged higher interest rates than were permitted by state law. Id. The Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision, finding that the usury laws of
Nebraska governed Omaha Bank's actions under Eighth Circuit precedent. Id. at 306-07.
The plaintiffs then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 307.
100. Id. at 308.
101. Id. at 308-10. The parties agreed that the bank itself was located in Nebraska, but
disagreed as to whether the BankAmericard program was located in Nebraska, or whether
it was located in Minnesota because it was soliciting residents there. Id. at 309-10.
102. Id. at 310. The Court drew an analogy to Minnesota residents traveling to
Nebraska to take out a loan there, pointing out that no one would suggest that Minnesota
usury laws would be applicable in such a case. Id. at 310-11.
103. Id. at 313.
104. Id. at 314. This exportation doctrine was closely followed in later cases, which
applied the NBA to other bank charges, most importantly in Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S.
735, 737 (1996). In Smiley, the Supreme Court examined whether § 85 also permitted
banks to charge late fees that were permissible in the bank's home state, but not in the
state where some of the bank's customers were. Id. The Court held that late fees were
covered, and that even though they were illegal in the state of the credit card user, the out-
of-state bank was entitled to charge those fees because they were legal in the bank's home
state. See id. at 739-40, 747. In nearly every type of consumer loan transaction, courts
have consistently followed this concept of rate exportation. See, e.g., Cades v. H & R
Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 874-76 (4th Cir. 1994) (allowing a Delaware bank to lend money
through a tax preparation company to a customer who agreed to sign over his income tax
return and received his expected return minus an interest rate); Basile v. H & R Block,
Inc., 897 F. Supp. 194, 198-99 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem. order granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment) (permitting a tax return refund loan where both the tax preparation
service and the bank headquarters were in Pennsylvania, but a subsidiary of the bank in
Delaware actually made the loan in order to escape Pennsylvania's usury limitations);
Wiseman v. State Bank & Trust, 854 S.W.2d 725, 726-27 (Ark. 1993) (allowing a lender to
escape Arkansas usury limits where Arkansas residents bought a car in Arkansas and were
lent funds by an Arkansas bank through its subsidiary in Oklahoma, even though the
limited contact with Oklahoma consisted of only a fax of the loan papers and a return
phone call).
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a crucial blow to the effectiveness of state interest rate protections, the
Court dismissed Marquette's contention that rate exportation would
undermine state usury laws, finding that such "impairment ... has always
been implicit in the structure of the National Bank Act."'' 5 The Court
held that the protection of such laws "is an issue of legislative policy, and
any plea to alter § 85 to further that end is better addressed to the
wisdom of Congress than to the judgment of this Court."' 6
Yet, instead of altering § 85, Congress passed the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, part of which
became 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a), to equalize the treatment of state banks. 
7
States also significantly liberalized their usury laws, with some even going
so far as to eliminate interest limits altogether. This has created a
landslide of deregulation, effectively abandoning consumer interest rate
limitations, such that "all but a small part of consumer credit in every
state will eventually be subject to unlimited rates that are imported from
states with unlimited rates."' 9
2. Rent-a-Bank and the Use of Marquette by the Payday Industry
Payday lenders have exploited Marquette and these federal statutes"0
by affiliating with banks that are free from effective state usury
105. Marquette, 439 U.S. at 318.
106. Id. at 319. As the Court pointed out, statutory revisions could alter the usury
regulatory framework set up by § 85 and Marquette, id., but this did not happen in the way
that consumer advocates might have preferred. Instead, Congress amended federal law to
allow state banks to have the same exportation rights that national banks enjoyed under §
85, and many state laws were changed to allow in-state banks to compete more effectively
with out-of-state banks. White, supra note 9, at 453; see also supra notes 37-41 and
accompanying text.
107. Sherman v. Citibank, 640 A.2d 325, 328 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994), rev'd,
668 A.2d 1036 (N.J. 1995), vacated, 517 U.S. 1241 (1996). Section 1831d "essentially
incorporated section 85 into the legislation governing federally-insured state banks, in
order to achieve parity between state and national banks." Id. Under the new federal
statute, state-chartered banks were free to export interest rates. See Jessup v. Pulaski
Bank, 327 F.3d 682. 684-85 (8th Cir. 2003) (permitting Alabama bank to lend credit card
through Arkansas branch to Texas borrower); Aronson v. Capital One Fin. Corp., 125 F.
Supp. 2d 142, 145-46 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (order granting defendant's motion for summary
judgment) (allowing exportation of fees as well as interest by state bank); Hunter v.
Greenwood Trust Co., 856 F. Supp. 207, 213 n.4 (D.N.J. 1992).
108. White, supra note 9, at 454. The FDIC has also said that the purpose of 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831d was to prohibit discrimination against state banks, because the state banks would
not be able to compete equally with national banks without an equivalent to § 85. Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp., Ltr. No. 92-47, [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81,534 (July 8, 1992) [hereinafter FDIC Ltr. No. 92-47]; see also Federal Interest
Rate Authority, supra note 11, at 60,026 (describing how this statute "rectif[ied] the
imbalance that had been created" by Marquette in favor of national banks).
109. White, supra note 9, at 465; see also supra note 38-39 and accompanying text.
110. Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 27(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000).
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regulations, allowing these lenders to use any interest rate that would be
legal in the out-of-state bank's home state.' In these rent-a-bank
arrangements, the out-of-state bank will make the loan and the in-state
payday lenders will immediately purchase that loan-"[i]n effect, the
lender has 'rented' the bank's name for purposes of making a legal
loan."12 The out-of-state bank underwrites the loan, while the payday
lender generates the loan, collects the payment, and completes the
paperwork."' This allows the payday lender to charge any rate allowed
in the partner bank's home state, completely protecting the payday
lender from state usury laws, even though the payday lender does all of
the work.1 4  This creates "a significant barrier to state regulation of
111. Winebarger, supra note 6, at 320-21. Through these rent-a-bank relationships,
"payday lenders attached to even the most insignificant of federal banks remain free to
charge whatever interest rates they choose." PETERSON, supra note 1, at 13.
112. Barr, supra note 6, at 151.
113. Creola Johnson, supra note 1, at 106. The payday lender and out-of-state bank
then share the profits made from the loans. Id. As a result of modern technology, it often
takes less than twenty minutes from loan application to payment, including time for the
payday lender to transmit the necessary data to the out-of-state bank, and then to receive
approval of the loan. Barr, supra note 6, at 151. Even if an in-state affiliated bank helps
originate and close the loan, the out-of-state bank can use its home state's interest rate
laws because the lender bank would be located in the state where it has its main office for
the purposes of § 85. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Interpretive Ltr. No. 721,
[1995-1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-036 (Mar. 6, 1996).
114. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1277. Federal regulators have confirmed this
interpretation of § 85, even where the out-of-state bank itself has a branch in the state of
the borrower, thereby allowing exportation. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Interpretive Ltr. No. 822, 1998 WL 126800, at *4 (Feb. 17, 1998). Thus, "an interstate
national bank may charge interest permitted by the laws of its home state unless the loan
is made . . . in a branch or branches of the bank in a single host state." Id. at *8. A
number of states and plaintiffs have attempted to reign in the abuses of payday lenders
that partnered with out-of-state banks to avoid usury laws by claiming that the in-state
payday lender was actually the lender, rather than the out-of-state partner bank, and
therefore the in-state payday lender would be subject to usury laws. See, e.g., Goleta Nat'l
Bank v. O'Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d 745, 750 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (order granting defendant's
motion to dismiss) (finding that a national bank did not have standing under § 85 to bring
suit against a state seeking to adversely regulate an in-state payday lender that rented the
national bank's charter); Hudson v. Ace Cash Express, Inc., No. IP 01-1336-C H/S, 2002
WL 1205060, at *4, 7 (S.D. Ind. May 30, 2002) (order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss) (finding preemption of an individual plaintiff's claims); Goleta Nat'l Bank v.
Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 (E.D.N.C. 2002) (order granting defendant's motion to
dismiss) (agreeing to address the preemption issue in a case brought by a state). These
claims have had mixed success in avoiding the preemption of federal banking law, mainly
because it is difficult to prove that the in-state lender was making the loan and could be
regulated under existing state usury laws. See Hudson, 2002 WL 1205060, at *7 (finding
that the out-of-state bank made the loan, so the federal banking act preempted the state
law usury claim); cf O'Donnell, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 753 (holding that Ohio could regulate
the in-state payday lender under state usury law if the state could show that the payday
lender, and not the national bank, was making the loan, but again not deciding the factual
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fringe market lending.' ' 115  The protection provided by these
arrangements is so complete that payday lenders have not tried to
disguise the high cost of their services because with these charters, they
have "unfettered discretion" to lend as they wish." 6
3. Federal Regulatory Action Permits Rent-a-Bank
Federal regulators have begun to regulate payday lenders more
closely, particularly rent-a-bank relationships;"7 yet, because one major
federal banking authority permits rent-a-bank agreements, the same
practices continue. " ' The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC) has been the most active federal agency in this area, driving all
national banks out of rent-a-bank entirely." 9 The 0CC has recognized
that the intent behind these partnerships between out-of-state national
banks and in-state third-party lenders has been to avoid state consumer
protections laws, particularly usury laws.2 Another major concern for
issue of who was actually the lender); Lingerfelt, 211 F. Supp. 2d at 718 (holding that
federal law would preempt only if it could be proven that the out-of-state bank, and not
the payday lender, was actually making the loan, but not deciding the issue of the actual
lender).
115. Drysdale & Keest, supra note 6, at 605. Federal banking authorities have
supported this deregulated view of interest rate exportation, interpreting 12 U.S.C. §
1831d to give state-chartered banks "most favored lender" status, which allowed them to
charge any interest rate permitted in their home state to borrowers in other states "even if
that rate exceeds the maximum permitted by an out-of-state borrower's state of
residence." FDIC Ltr. No. 92-47, supra note 108.
116. Bruch, supra note 6, at 1278 (2001); see also FDIC Ltr. No. 92-47, supra note 108
(interpreting 12 U.S.C. § 1831d to "authorize[] state-chartered banks insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation . . . to 'export' the same fees and charges on
interstate loans that national banks can export under 12 U.S.C. § 85").
117. See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Consumer Protection News:
Payday Lending, http://www.occ.gov/Consumer/payday.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2006)
[hereinafter OCC Consumer Protection News]; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Guidelines for Payday Lending, http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/payday (last visited
Aug. 11, 2006) [hereinafter FDIC Guidelines for Payday Lending].
118. See Letter from Jean Ann Fox, Dir. of Consumer Prot., Consumer Fed'n of Am.,
to Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 4-5 (Mar. 3, 2003), available at http://www.consumerfed.orgl
pdfs/fdic030203.pdf (regarding the 2003 draft guidelines on payday lending by FDIC-
insured banks).
119. OCC Consumer Protection News, supra note 117 ("A handful of national banks
essentially rented out their charters to third party payday lenders .... The OCC took a
series of enforcement actions that eliminated these relationships from the national
banking system.").
120. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Special Supervision and Enforcement
Activities, 22 Q.J. 23, 29 (2003), available at http://www.occ.gov/qj/qj22-3/qj22-3.pdf; see
also News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Peoples National Bank to
Pay $175,000 Civil Money Penalty and End Payday Lending Relationship with Advance
America (Jan. 31, 2003), http://www.occ.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?doc=2bqjoxbc.xml
(quoting the Comptroller of the Currency as "greatly concerned with arrangements in
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the OCC has been that these partnerships create serious safety and
soundness problems for the national banks involved.1 2 ' Because of these
concerns, in 2003, the OCC ensured that "all national banks with known
payday lending activities through third-party vendors were ordered to
exit the payday lending business.',
22
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), on the other
hand, has not driven federally insured state banks out of rent-a-bank
practices, leading payday lenders to turn to state banks to ensure the
continuance of their lending operations with the advantages of rent-a-
bank. 23 The FDIC has issued guidelines on payday lending by federally
insured state banks, but these guidelines specifically allow for
partnerships with in-state lenders whereby the out-of-state bank exports
its rates "regardless of usury limitations imposed by the state laws of the
borrower's residence.1 24 Thus, despite concerns over bank safety and
which national banks essentially rent out their charters to third parties who want to evade
state and local consumer protection laws"); News Release, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, OCC Concludes Case Against First National Bank in Brookings Involving
Payday Lending, Unsafe Merchant Processing, and Deceptive Marketing of Credit Cards
(Jan. 21, 2003), http://www.occ.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?doc=c4gdhg4l.xml (stating
that the Comptroller of the Currency believes the "underlying purpose of the relationship
is to afford the vendor an escape from state and local laws that would otherwise apply to
it").
121. See, e.g., News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes
Action Against ACE Cash Express, Inc. and Goleta National Bank (Oct. 29, 2002),
http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/2002-85.txt. For the Comptroller of the Currency, this
represented an instance of "the risks national banks expose themselves to when they rent
out their charters to third-party vendors and fail to exercise sound oversight." Id.; see also
News Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Files Notice of Charges
Against People's National Bank of Paris, Texas (Mar. 18, 2002),
http://www.occ.gov/ftp/release/2002-26.txt (stating that such "unsafe and unsound
practices ... are likely to weaken the condition of the bank and prejudice the interests of
the bank's depositors").
122. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 120, at 29.
123. Press Release, Consumer Fed'n of Am., Consumer Federation of America
Applauds Comptroller Action to Halt Rent-A-Bank Payday Lending by Peoples National
Bank of Paris, TX (Jan. 31, 2003), http://www.consumerfed.org/releases
2.cfm?filename=013103OCCPeoplesaction.txt (stating that because OCC has driven
national banks out of the rent-a-bank market, payday lenders are instead using state
banks). This is despite opposition from the majority of state governments, who have
encouraged the FDIC to address rent-a-bank practices on the party of federally insured
state banks. States Want FDIC Crackdown on Payday Lenders, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM,
May 17, 2005, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/payday-ags.html [hereinafter
States Want FDIC Crackdown on Payday Lenders]. The thirty-seven state attorneys
general who sent a letter to the FDIC argued that "the FDIC has encouraged a cynical
subversion of state laws on the part of the payday lending industry and has interfered with
the states' rights to apply and enforce our consumer protection and lending laws." Id.
124. FDIC Guidelines for Payday Lending, supra note 117. The current guidelines for
state banks in the payday lending market were revised in March 2005. Press Release, Fed.
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soundness as well as compliance issues, the FDIC is willing to permit
rent-a-bank as long as "effective risk controls are implemented. '2 5 This
has led payday lenders to partner with out-of-state state banks, rather
than national banks, because of the differences in enforcement between
the FDIC and the OCC, leaving consumers in effectively the same
position. 26
4. BankWest and the Eleventh Circuit's Resurrection of State Usury
Laws Through a New Analysis of Federal Preemption
The state of Georgia had its own plans for reining in the unintended
abuses of federal banking law, particularly attempts by lenders to
disguise local payday transactions as loans from out-of-state banks to
avoid state usury limits. 27 Georgia passed a statute requiring any lender
that offered loans of up to $3,000 to comply with state usury limits, but it
exempted out-of-state banks. 8 The lenders specifically covered by the
statute included "'purported agent[s] [where] . . . the entire
circumstances of the transaction show that the purported agent holds,
acquires, or maintains a predominant economic interest in the revenues
generated by the loan.' 1 29 The Act provided for criminal punishment
and serious civil penalties for violators.30
Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Revises Payday Lending Guidance (Mar. 2, 2005),
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2005/pr1905.html.
125. FDIC Guidelines for Payday Lending, supra note 117. The FDIC was concerned
about risk management, strategic planning, and ensuring that "competent and qualified
third party provider[s]" were used. Id. Additionally, the FDIC wanted to ensure that in
these relationships, there was an appropriate written contract that met a variety of
standards, as well as that the state bank's management would devote "sufficient staff with
the necessary expertise to oversee" the in-state lender. Id.
126. Letter from Jean Ann Fox, to Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 118, at 4-5
(regarding the 2003 draft guidelines on payday lenders). Most state attorney generals
believe that the recent 2005 revision to the payday lending regulations does not really deal
with the problems presented by rent-a-bank. States Want FDIC Crackdown on Payday
Lenders, supra note 123; see also Fox, supra note 38, at 19-20 (describing how OCC
regulatory action has driven payday lenders to partner with FDIC-insured state banks).
127. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1340-41 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (citing
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-7-1(c) (2004)), affd, 411 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and
appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (vacating the
previous decision as moot because the plaintiffs withdrew from payday lending during the
appeal).
128. Id. at 1341,
129. Id. (citing GA. CODEANN. § 16-7-2(b)(4)).
130. Id. at 1342 (explaining how the civil penalties for violating this new statute
included damages of triple the amount of any interest on such loans, and allowed for both
state officials and private individuals to bring actions under the statute).
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Because this statute would seriously hinder the rent-a-bank scheme
under which Georgia lenders partnered with out-of-state banks,' payday
lenders and their partner banks based in South Dakota and Delaware
brought suit in federal court to obtain an injunction preventing the
operation of the new statute. 32 However, the district court denied the
motion,'33 holding that the statute was not preempted by federal banking
law.
134
While recognizing that federal banking law, specifically 12 U.S.C. §
1831d, 35 preempted state law by allowing banks to export the interest
rate laws of their home states to customers in another state, 36 the court
found that federal law did not preempt all state action in the area of
banking regulation, and that it would not be impossible for a business
covered by the laws to comply with both the Georgia and federal
statutes.' 37 Furthermore, the court believed that the purpose of § 1831d
was to equalize the treatment of state and national banks in the area of
interest rate exportation, and the court held that the Georgia statute did
not "stand as an obstacle to achieving this objective and is therefore not
preempted.,
138
The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision.9 The judges
looked closely at the issue of preemption,'4 but found that although
"Georgia's usury laws present a serious problem for the plaintiff payday
131. Id. at 1356-57.
132. Id. at 1338-39.
133. Id. at 1339.
134. Id. at 1351.
135. Section 1831d was part of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 132, 164-68.
136. BankWest, 324 F. Supp. 2d at 1344. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) was a corollary to § 85,
giving state banks the same protections as national banks. Id.
137. Id. at 1345 (holding that "the FDIA [Federal Deposit Insurance Act] was not
intended to 'occupy the field' of state bank regulation").
138. Id. at 1346. Crucial to the court were its findings that there was a "complete
exemption" for out-of-state banks, and that such banks would be able to continue to make
payday loans in Georgia as long as they either did the lending themselves or had an agent
in Georgia that did not receive the majority of the economic benefits from the loans. Id.
The court contended that there was no reason to believe that payday lenders would be
unable to conduct a profitable business under conditions where they could not have the
predominant interest in the revenue. Id. at 1347. For the district court, this meant that the
Georgia statute avoided preemption because it was not aimed at the national and out-of-
state banks that Congress was protecting through federal legislation, but rather the "non-
bank entities that receive a predominant share of the revenues from payday loans but, in
an effort to avoid Georgia's usury laws, contract with out-of-state banks to play the role of
the lender." Id.
139. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and appeal
dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
140. See id. at 1292.
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stores," 4 the new law was not preempted. The Eleventh Circuit
acknowledged that under federal banking law, out-of-state banks were
entitled to charge their home state interest rates, 143 but held that the
statute in question was aimed only at in-state payday businessesi 44 The
court examined the possibility of field preemption, conflict
146 147preemption, and express preemption.
The court quickly determined that there was no field or conflict
preemption,14 ' but the question of express preemption proved much
trickier. To address this issue, the court broke down the relevant federal
statute using a three-part test. 149 The court determined that the federal
statute only expressly preempted state statutes that prevent a state bank
from using the interest rates permitted in their home state on any loan.5
The question for the court, then, was whether the state statute was
attempting to regulate banks in this manner, or as the court stated,
"whether the Act ...is a prohibited interest-rate limitation on loans
between BankWest and its borrowers or a permitted agency regulation
on when non-bank payday stores operating in Georgia may properly
serve as agents for out-of-state banks."''
The court found that the statute was only a regulation of the agency
relationship between the payday stores in Georgia and the out-of-state
banks, and therefore was not preempted by federal law. 52 The court
justified its decision by noting that the law did not limit the interest rate
that an out-of-state bank could charge in-state customers, and that there
were many ways for out-of-state banks to pursue payday lending in
Georgia. 1 3 Finally, the court contended that the federal banking law did
not alter the permissible ways in which a state could regulate the in-state
agents of out-of-state banks. 14  Therefore, there was no express
141. Id. at 1293. Georgia set a maximum APR of 16% for loans up to $3,000, id., but
this maximum APR did not apply to banks chartered in other states, allowing such banks
to charge interest, such as 400-500% APR, as permitted under the laws of their home
states. Id. at 1296.
142. Id. at 1306.
143. Id. at 1296.
144. Id. at 1297.
145. Id. at 1301-02.
146. Id. at 1302-03.
147. Id. at 1303-09.
148. Id. at 1301-03.
149. Id. at 1304.
150. Id. at 1304-05.
151. Id. at 1305.
152. Id. at 1305-06.
153. Id. at 1306.
154. Id.
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preemption of Georgia's authority to pass a statute that forced in-state
payday loan companies who partnered with out-of-state banks to comply
with in-state usury limitations, as long as "the payday store retains the
predominate economic interest in the payday loan."'55
II. FEDERAL LAW PREEMPTION LEAVES ROOM FOR THE CONSUMER
PROTECTION ROLE OF THE STATES IN PAYDAY LENDING
A. There Is No Express Preemption of Georgia's Law
In performing the preemption analysis that was crucial to determining
whether § 1831d prevented Georgia from regulating the in-state payday
lenders, the Eleventh Circuit followed the appropriate narrow
interpretation of federal law, guided by Supreme Court precedent.5 6 For
the court, the only real question was express preemption, which it found
did not exist.5 5 The three-part test that the court of appeals used to
determine whether there was express preemption of the Georgia statute
explains precisely what the federal law preempted, and when applied to
the Georgia statute, demonstrated that federal law did not preempt the
new law. 11 According to the Eleventh Circuit, the "plain language" of
the federal statute preempted state laws that prevent "[11 a State bank..
. [2] from charging interest at the rate allowed by the home State... [3]
on any loan."'5 9 This was the limit of the federal law, as it did not apply
to agreements between in-state lenders and out-of-state banks; in fact,
the federal statute did not mention "in-state, non-bank agents or agents
at all.''6°
155. Id. The court also concluded that federal law did not preempt other aspects of
the Georgia statute, including the ability to prosecute out-of-state banks for assisting in
usurious loans, id. at 1307-08, and the ability of the state to void the contract and allow for
civil damages. Id. at 1308-09. The court also rejected the dormant Commerce Clause
claim, reasoning that "[iut is undisputed that the Act makes no attempt to regulate the
interest rate out-of-state banks can charge borrowers in Georgia," and that "the Act
actually places fewer restrictions on out-of-state banks than it does on Georgia-based
banks." Id. at 1310. A dissent by Judge Carnes, however, bitterly disputed the findings of
the court, particularly the majority's holding as to the nature of the loan. Id. at 1312
(Carnes, J., dissenting). Judge Carnes asserted that because BankWest was making the
loans, it was therefore "the true lender." Id. at 1313-14. For the dissent, this meant that
BankWest qualified as an out-of-state bank making "any loan" under the terms of the
statute, and thus a state law that attempted to restrict the interest rates charged was
preempted. Id. at 1315-16.
156. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 542 (2001); Fla. Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
157. BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1306.
158. Id. at 1304.
159. Id.
160. Id. The parties disputed the FDIC's position on this issue; however, the court
found it unnecessary to decide which interpretation to follow, reasoning that under Smiley
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This interpretation closely follows the rules of express preemption
statutory interpretation set out by the Supreme Court, which encourage
limiting express preemption to "the language of the statute' 16' when
interpreting federal law.16 In § 1831d, Congress did not demonstrate that
it wanted to prevent states from regulating the in-state partners of out-of-
state banks; it only wanted to prevent states from prohibiting out-of-state
banks from lending money at rates permitted by the bank's home state.
163
Because the statute clearly identifies its purpose, it is preferable that the
courts not go beyond that and find a wider field of preemption,4 because
''congressional purpose to displace local laws must be clearly
manifested.',
165
Congress' intent with this statute was not to preempt what Georgia
was attempting to do, but rather to remove the disadvantage to state
banks caused by Marquette's interpretation of § 85.166 The narrow
reading of § 1831d in BankWest, using the three-part test, preserves this
intent, neither stretching it nor limiting it further than what Congress/ 67
wanted. In applying this three-part test to the Georgia statute, the
BankWest court found that the statute did not prohibit a state bank from
lending to Georgia residents at an interest rate that was legal in the out-
v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735 (1996), it was not obligated to give deference to agency positions
regarding preemption. BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1300. Under Smiley v. Citibank, no
deference to the agency was necessary when the agency gave its opinion as to preemption,
rather than a substantive interpretation of a statute. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 744.
161. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 542. The Supreme Court held that because the
presumption is against preemption, statutes should be read narrowly to limit the
preemptive effect on state police powers. Id. at 541-42; see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress.").
162. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963) (arguing
that "federal regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state
regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons-either that the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion, or that the Congress has
unmistakably so ordained"). Some case law suggests that it is permissible to read a wider
intent into federal preemption, but there must be a reason to do so. See, e.g., Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995). Regarding § 1831d, however, there seems to be
no reason to read wider preemption into § 1831d than what Congress specifically intended
to preempt.
163. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000).
164. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 542.
165. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949). The Court's need for clear
congressional intent to preempt state regulation in an area shows that the Court errs
against preemption in the absence of "persuasive reasons evidencing congressional intent
favoring preemption." 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12.4, at 217 (3d ed. 1999).
166. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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of-state bank's home state.16  It was simply a question of whether the
state was trying to do what the federal law had preempted (regulating
out-of-state lenders who loaned to Georgia residents) or whether it was
merely a regulation of agencies in Georgia,169 which other cases had not
addressed. 7 " The court's analysis showed that Georgia's law was, in fact,
a "permitted agency limitation."'
17
1
This narrow reading of the statute is preferable to the alternative,
172which defers completely to an expansive view of preemption, because it
is more consistent with the standard preemption analysis, which favors a
narrow reading.' 73  As the Supreme Court stated in Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v. Reilly, "'an express definition of the pre-emptive reach of a statute
• .. supports a reasonable inference ... that Congress did not intend to
pre-empt other matters., 7 4 The state intent of § 1831d was "to prevent
discrimination against State-chartered insured depository institutions.'
7'
Therefore, under Lorillard, a court should interpret federal law to do
exactly what it states. 76 Section 1831d does not cover third-party lenders;
on its face, it only preempts "any State constitution or statute" that seeks
to prohibit out-of-state banks from charging their home-state interest,
77
not the rates that can be charged by in-state, non-bank partners. This is
precisely the interpretation that the court gave to the statute,' 8 guided by
Lorillard and other preemption cases.171
The main argument against the BankWest holding is that the decision
is "so narrow that it effectively repeals the statute" because "the majority
168. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and
appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11 th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
169. Id. at 1305.
170. See, e.g., Krispin v. May Dep't Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000)
(dealing with a private suit brought against an in-state lender under state usury laws and
finding that such claims were preempted by the NBA).
171. BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1305-06.
172. See Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8, BankWest, 411 F.3d 1289 (No. 04-12420)
[hereinafter Petition for Rehearing En Banc].
173. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2002); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525, 541-42 (2001).
174. Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S.
280, 288 (1995)) (omissions in original); see also Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S.
497, 505 (1978) (using the plain language of a federal statute that stated what the law did
not preempt to determine the actual extent of preemption).
175. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000).
176. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 541-42.
177. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a).
178. BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and
appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
179. See, e.g., Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., 519
U.S. 316, 325 (1997).
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has clearly endorsed any and all state-law restrictions on state bank loans
... so long as the restrictions do not directly limit the interest that may be
charged.' ' 8 0  Yet, what these advocates do not see is that the federal
statute in question does not actually prohibit these limitations.8' Instead,
the statute prohibits discriminatory treatment against out-of-state banks,
a topic not even relevant to BankWest because the Act is aimed only at
in-state lenders." Congress' non-discrimination preemption intent is
unaffected.1
3
Because Congress expressly discussed preemption in the statute, the
Eleventh Circuit correctly refrained from inferring even wider
preemption.' BankWest's only hope was to request a much looser.. 185
understanding of federal preemption, but this was a weak argument
because the statute states exactly what it intended to preempt. Is6 As the
maxim states, "expressio unius est exclusio alterius: Congress' enactment
of a provision defining the pre-emptive reach of a statute implies that
matters beyond that reach are not pre-empted.', 87 By reading § 1831d
narrowly and following the express preemptive intent of Congress
written in the statute itself, the Eleventh Circuit came to a preemptive
interpretation most consistent with Supreme Court precedent and
congressional intent-"the 'ultimate touchstone' of preemption
analysis."'' l
B. Congress' Commercial Purpose Protected by BankWest
Even though the field preemption discussion in BankWest was189
cursory, an examination of Congress' purpose in passing the NBA
180. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 172, at 5, 7.
181. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a).
182. See BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1305-06.
183. See id. at 1302.
184. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (noting that "[w]hen
Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in the enacted
legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue," a court should not read preemption
more widely into the statute). The presumption against preemption has been widely
followed. See, e.g., N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Rowe, 377 F. Supp. 2d 197, 206 (D. Me.
2005) (order granting motions for summary judgment); Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d
422, 451-52 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1169 (2006).
185. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 172, at 4-6.
186. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a).
187. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517.
188. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 165, § 12.4, at 216.
189. See BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1301-02 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and
appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358 (1 1th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Field preemption
occurs where federal regulation of a particular field is so extensive that it appears to leave
no room for state regulation of the same field. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S.
597, 605 (1991); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (holding that
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shows that Congress intended to regulate only the commercial lending
field, and did not intend to undermine the traditional usury protection
role of the states,' 90 which is an entirely separate field.' 9' Therefore,
BankWest, in addition to following the correct express preemption
analysis, also protected Congress' commercial purpose in passing both §
85 and § 1831d using its authority under the Commerce Clause:
equalizing the status of national banks with that of state banks, thereby
creating a more vigorous national economy. 92 Congress' purpose of
regulating commercial lending continues to be effective under BankWest
because all banks are treated equally; there is no discrimination against
any particular type of bank.9 Advocates for payday lenders dispute this
contention, asserting that the Eleventh Circuit used such a narrow
preemption analysis "that it reintroduces the very discrimination against.
. . state banks that Congress intended to eliminate.' ' 194  In reality,
Congress' real purpose is fulfilled under the Eleventh Circuit's
interpretation because the regulation only applies directly to in-state
lenders, not to banks at all.' 95 BankWest's preemption analysis will not
undermine Congress' purpose by putting state banks at a competitive
disadvantage compared to national banks, despite what BankWest's
supporters assert. '96 Even if BankWest is unable to engage in rent-a-
bank, under current federal regulations, national banks cannot do so
either.
97
state law could be preempted "[i]f Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field" in
which there was also state law).
190. See supra Part I.A.
191. See supra Part I.A-B. There is also an argument that the very language of the
statutes in question shows that Congress never intended for high interest rates to become
widely accepted, and, in fact, visualized a fairly low standard rate. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831d.
The current language of § 85 states Congress' intent to set the maximum annual interest
rate national banks could charge at 7% if no rate is otherwise set by state law. 12 U.S.C. §
85 (2000). Indeed, as one of the first cases to interpret § 85 showed, the 7% rate was the
general default provision, the bright line chosen by Congress; higher percentages were
only allowed where it was necessary to create competitive parity between national banks
and state banks. Tiffany v. Nat'l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 411-12 (1874)
(finding the NBA to be a critical enabling statute for national banks).
192. See supra Part I.A; see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2130 (1864)
(citing the ability of national banking to increase the flow of capital).
193. See Bank West, 411 F.3d at 1305-06.
194. Brief for the American Financial Services Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3, BankWest, 411 F.3d 1289 (No. 04-12420) [hereinafter
Brief for American Financial Services Ass'n].
195. See BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1305-06.
196. See Brief for American Financial Services Ass'n, supra note 194, at 4-5.
197. See supra Part I.D.3; cf BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1302 (limiting only the in-state
lender's ability to lend at any interest rate, not the right of the banks to do so themselves).
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Furthermore, BankWest helps to remedy the major unintended
consequence of Congress' passage of these statutes: the rent-a-bank
schemes of payday lenders, who charge extremely high interest rates to
those who can least afford them.'99 In liberalizing banking law, Congress
never intended to hurt the poor, and the regulatory actions by the OCC
and FDIC demonstrate that this purpose has never been read into the
statute, even if these organizations have found the actions to be legally
permissible. 9 Eliminating state regulation of consumption loans does
not serve Congress' interstate commerce purpose, and instead eliminates
the historical distinction between consumption loans and commercial
loans apparent in the Western tradition and embodied in state usury
200protections.
The narrow reading encompassed in the three-part test of BankWest is
an appropriate way to read the federal statute, providing a
straightforward method of achieving the goals of the federal law and
allowing states to serve their crucial role in protecting their citizens from
exploitative usury, two separate fields of regulation.2 0 ' The court read
the statute to only allow out-of-state banks to use interest rates permitted
202in their home states on any loan, no matter where it was made. This
reading allows states to regulate rent-a-bank relationships, 2 3 which is the
source of most of the interest rate abuse in payday lending.2 0" This
interpretation refocuses federal banking law on Congress' real purpose-
smoothing interstate commerce-rather than eliminating state consumer
protections; additionally, this reading allows states to fulfill their historic
205and moral role in protecting consumers from commercial abuse,
198. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
199. See supra Parts I.A, I.D.2-3.
200. See supra Parts IA, I.C.
201. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, GEORGIA'S PAYDAY LAW
UPHELD 1, 2 (2005), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/GA-Bankwest-v.Baker.pdf
(recommending that states follow the lead of Georgia by enacting similar regulations).
The Eleventh Circuit's concentration on protecting the intent of Congress is appropriate.
See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 541 (2001); Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368-69
(1986); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941) (holding that in preemption
cases, it is important to determine if the "law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress").
202. BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1304.
203. Id. at 1305-06.
204. See supra Part I.D.2; notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Parts .A, I.C. Because the purpose was to prevent discrimination
against state banks by allowing them to export their rates, the federal law achieves this
goal. See BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1306; see also Beneficial Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S.
1, 10 (2003) (finding that the National Bank Act completely preempted state usury claims
against out-of-state national banks, but did not define any greater area of preemption).
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an issue payday lending supporters completely ignore.6
C. A Balance of Federal and State Interest Favors No Preemption
While the BankWest court's discussion of conflict preemption was also
limited, 207 a balancing of the federal and state interests involved supports
an inference that even if there were a conflict, the state interest in the
case of payday lending should be paramount. Indeed, some authorities
have suggested that there is an implicit balancing in preemption cases.208
This occurs most notably in Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, where the dissent suggested that a state regulation, because it
protected only an economic interest and not a health interest, does not
carry as much weight. 2°9
The federal interest expressed in payday lending can only be economic
efficiency: the ability of banks to partner with in-state lenders to more
easily market their products to payday lending consumers. This produces
210a fairly large payday lending market that reaches many people.
However, the case for federal preemption is unpersuasive because under
the terms of BankWest, while rent-a-bank arrangements would certainly
suffer in states with laws like Georgia's,2 1 banks are still free to engage in
payday lending themselves. Thus, there is no real danger that Congress'
212interest in competitive equality in banking will suffer. Banking
206. See, e.g., Brief for American Financial Services Ass'n, supra note 194; Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 172.
207. See BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1302-03. Conflict preemption occurs "when it is
impossible to comply with both federal and state law and when state law stands as an
obstacle to achieving the objectives of the federal law." Cliff v. Payco Gen. Am. Credits,
Inc., 363 F.3d 1113, 1122 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 248 (1984) ("If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the
matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with
federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law ....").
208. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 330-31
(15th ed. 2004) (suggesting that there may be a balancing of state and national interests in
preemption cases).
209. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 168-69 (1963) (White,
J., dissenting) (stressing the different weight that the court should have afforded to health
interests rather than economic interests); see also Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S.
125, 147 n.6 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "preserving States' general
regulatory authority" is one factor to consider when deciding a preemption dispute).
210. See supra note 6.
211. BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1317-18 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (explaining how the
Georgia law severely restricts out-of-state banks that seek to engage in payday lending).
212. Id. at 1297-98 (majority opinion) (explaining the Georgia Act's exemptions for
out-of-state banks).
11632006]
Catholic University Law Review
equality, the means of creating economic efficiency, remains just as
viable with or without this state regulation.213
On the other hand, the state's interest in protecting its consumers from
payday lenders who use rent-a-bank arrangements to circumvent usury
laws is significant, because the interest rates alone produce a damaging
effect on the individual consumer. 1 4  By discouraging rent-a-bank
relationships, a state can reduce this exploitation because most banks
determine that payday lending creates serious image problems for them,
as shown by the OCC crackdown, making them unlikely to payday lend
without a front company."5 Thus, in light of the large number of
consumers adversely affected by rent-a-bank payday lenders,"' and theS 217
state police power interest in preventing usurious transactions, there is
a legitimate state interest implicated by Georgia-type regulation, and this
state interest outweighs the limited federal interest.
218
D. The Potential Widespread Impact of BankWest in Allowing States to
Regulate the Payday Lending Industry
If the test in BankWest becomes the standard used when evaluating
220express preemption under either FDIA section 27(a)" 9 or the NBA,
states can follow Georgia's lead in regulating the agency relationship
221between banks and payday lenders, eliminating rent-a-bank practices.
If more states were to enact similar laws, payday lenders would have
reduced access to borrowers, and would be less able to offer such
unfavorable interest rates on payday loans.222 BankWest's three-part test
for preemption will allow states to do indirectly what they cannot do
223directly. Indeed, as one consumer protection group has acknowledged,
213. See id.
214. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (describing the possible interest rates).
215. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 6.
217. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
219. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2000).
220. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2000). This would only be relevant if the OCC allowed renewed
payday lending by national banks. See supra Part I.D.3.
221. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 201, at 2.
222. See BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411 F.3d 1289, 1317 (11th Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the purpose of the Georgia legislature in regulating the agency
relationship was to get at the banks themselves), vacated and appeal dismissed as moot,
446 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam). Georgia, under the preemption analysis, can
regulate the in-state agents without fear of preemption, thereby regulating the out-of-state
banks as well. Id. ("Controlling a corporation's agents controls the corporation, just as
binding a man's arms and legs binds the man.").
223. See id.; see also Marquette Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv.
Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1978) (recognizing that preventing states from applying their
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"[t]his decision shows that effective regulation of payday lending
companies can be achieved without attempting to regulate banks.,
224
III. A TwO-PART SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PAYDAY LENDING
A. Embrace the Three-Part Test of BankWest
The first step toward reining in the abuses of payday lenders is for
other states to follow Georgia's lead and regulate rent-a-bank
relationships by enacting similar statutes that only regulate in-state
lenders and are not preempted by regulations on out-of-state banks.
25
Together with widespread acceptance of the three-part preemption test
developed in BankWest, this approach could greatly decrease the number
of payday lenders who operate free of state usury limitations. 26 Thus, as
long as state legislatures passed statutes that avoided prohibiting any
loan made by an out-of-state bank at a rate legal in that bank's state, as
the three-part test explains, it should not be preempted, and will allow
states to reclaim some of the powers that they appeared to lose under
Marquette, thereby reestablishing their traditional role of protecting poor
borrowers.222
The primary advantage of this approach is its workability. Currently, it• 228
is politically impossible to get § 85 and similar state laws repealed,
leaving any action that could limit rent-a-bank to the state legislatures
229and the courts. If Congress is unlikely to act, the states should follow
Georgia's example and the courts should follow the Eleventh Circuit's
lead, thereby taking at least a small step towards regulating payday
230
lenders.. It seems apparent that because of the NBA's preemption of
state usury laws, only state regulation of the administration of payday
loans will provide a workable solution for states trying to rein in their
abuses.3
usury rates to out-of-state banks is the natural result of interest rate exportation). This
may present a new way for states to regulate the payday lending industry, particularly if it
is widely followed. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 201, at 2.
224. CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 201, at 2.
225. See supra Part II.
226. See BankWest, 411 F.3d at 1317 (Carnes, J., dissenting).
227. See supra Parts I.C., II.
228. White, supra note 9, at 464.
229. See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 201, at 2.
230. See id. Even though the Eleventh Circuit vacated the BankWest holding because
of mootness, see BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 466 F.3d 1358, 1368 (11th Cir. 2006) (per
curiam), the holding still shows the reasonableness of the court's position regarding
preemption, and serves as a guide to later courts examining similar issues.
231. Winebarger, supra note 6, at 337. This is particularly true because the FDIC has
refused to drive the state banks it regulates out of the rent-a-bank business, despite the
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B. The Need for a Return to Dual-Natured Usury
As demonstrated above, usury was not historically the bland and
uniform legal creation in existence today, but instead embraced a
distinction between commercial and consumption lending."' Usury
prohibitions were based primarily on a desire to protect the poor from
wealthy lenders who might take advantage of their desperation by issuing
consumption loans that impoverished the borrower." Thus, there was
an understanding that such a transaction, in which the wealthy lender
enriched himself through consumption loans, was morally reprehensible
234and should be illegal. However, loans between the wealthy, which-235
were often income-generating, had no such moral baggage, and were
ignored by the courts.236 A return to this jurisprudential distinction in our
legal system would provide a permanent solution to the problem of
payday lending because it would protect those who are the most exposed
237to the possibility of usurious interest rates.
success of the OCC in that area. See supra Part I.D.3. There are those who suggest that
we should reject all state usury laws and rely instead on bankruptcy and collection
limitations as well as the borrowers' ability to evade debt as a way to protect borrowers
because a national usury law is not politically feasible. White, supra note 9, at 466.
However, if the three-part test of BankWest is widely followed, it will provide a non-
federal way to protect payday loan borrowers. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
Other solutions, such as relying on banks to fix the problems by providing payday loans
themselves and thus using price competition to improve the consumer market, or by using
different credit practices that have better terms than payday loans, including state
employee salary advance loans, lines of credit through checks, and direct deposit
advances, see Bertics, supra note 13, at 149-51, lack the immediacy of state statutory
solutions. Depending on banks to enact new lending schemes is not likely to provide any
relief in the near future because such practices would undoubtedly require a long time to
implement, and there would be no guarantee that these services would ever become
widely available. But see id. State regulation provides a more immediate and
comprehensive solution, as shown by Georgia's actions. See BankWest, Inc. v. Baker, 411
F.3d 1289, 1296-99 (11th Cir. 2005), vacated and appeal dismissed as moot, 446 F.3d 1358
(11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
232. See supra Part I.C.
233. See GILCHRIST, supra note 76, at 63-64; 1 HELMHOLZ, supra note 20, at 381;
Divine, supra note 61, at 498; Rasor, supra note 55, at 190.
234. See supra Part I.C.1.
235. See supra notes 74, 81, 87 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
237. Most of the alternatives to stricter state usury enforcement favored by other
scholars do not provide the same workable solution that this change in the understanding
of the tradition of usury would offer. Some scholars have suggested: that the federal
government pass legislation that sets limits on the APR of every kind of consumer
personal loan, see Bruch, supra note 6, at 1286; that federal legislation outlaw various
predatory practices, see Creola Johnson, supra note 1, at 116 (recommending federal
legislation to limit fees on payday loans, to outlaw rent-a-bank, to outlaw rollovers, to
outlaw criminal prosecutions for bad checks, and to demand proper notice for essential
contractual provisions); or that the government provide incentives to increase the supply
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As BankWest demonstrates, federal banking law does not preempt all
state usury protections. 8 This understanding needs to be more widely
embraced at all levels of the legal system, through both the common law
and statutes. The easiest method would be for Congress to enact laws
that express an understanding that out-of-state banks should be
unregulated, and thus free from usury laws, when lending commercially,
but that out-of-state banks should be subject to state usury limitations
when dealing in consumption loans.2 19 This would serve the dual purpose
of furthering Congress' interstate commerce interest and rehabilitating
the consumer protection role of the states. 40 Additionally, courts should
interpret usury laws with an understanding of the dual nature of usury,
applying them strictly to consumption-type loans while exempting
commercial loans from their review in accordance with congressional
intent.24 Perhaps if this understanding reemerges in our legal system,
interpretations of federal statutes will come to reflect it as well, undoing
242some of the unintentional damage done by federal banking law.
of standard banking services to the poor. See Barr, supra note 6, at 128. These solutions
are unworkable precisely because they would require a major shift in congressional policy,
which remains a nebulous hope at this time. See supra text accompanying note 228. The
recommendation of having national bank regulators closely supervise out-of-state bank
partnerships to ensure that the required disclosures are made and consumer protections
are in place, see Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five
Opportunities for the Bush Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 447, 461-62 (2002), would not solve the problem where all the
necessary disclosures are made and the required protections are in operation but the terms
of the payday loan contract itself are patently exploitative. Only the suggestion that
substantive unconscionability standards be codified in state statutes for use by borrowers
against payday lenders, see Steven W. Bender, Rate Regulation at the Crossroads of Usury
and Unconscionability: The Case for Regulating Abusive Commercial and Consumer
Interest Rates Under the Unconscionability Standard, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 721, 764-66 (1994),
seems workable, but it is not clear how such a change would escape preemption under
Marquette and the National Bank Act without a change in the basic understanding of
usury law and interest rate regulation.
238. See supra Part 11.
239. Here, a bright-line rule would prove useful, perhaps making all loans under
$1,000 for less than one year's duration subject to state usury laws in the state of the
borrower.
240. See supra Part IA-B.
241. This solution is more realistic because of the likely inaction of Congress. See
White, supra note 9, at 464.
242. A return to strict usury limitations on consumption loans would have a number of
benefits, particularly a reduction in consumer indebtedness. See Robin A. Morris,
Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale for Usury, 15 PEPP. L. REV. 151, 171 (1988).
The deregulation of banking and consumer credit industries has created more
competition, leading these institutions to expand the amount of credit they issue "and may
be the single most influential factor leading to problematic debt in our society today." Id.
at 169. Usury laws help resolve this situation by controlling the volume of credit available,
pushing back against market forces that act to expand the amount of credit. Id. at 158.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It should be a national embarrassment that poor borrowers who need a
short-term loan to put food on the table had more consumer protections
during the Middle Ages than they have under the current system of
243banking deregulation. We have neglected thousands of years of usury
tradition, under which governments and moral leaders protected the
poor from wealthy lenders through strict interest rate limitations on
consumption loans. 44 Only by reclaiming an understanding of the dual
nature of usury laws, and following the preemption analysis of BankWest,
can it be ensured that Congress' commercial goals are protected along
with the usury role of the states.
The unintentional consequences of federal banking policy for poor
consumers are not without a cure. The abuses of payday lending will
disappear if courts and legislatures return to a system of usury that is
both traditional and radically new-regulating consumption loans to the
246poor and exempting investment-oriented commercial lending.
State usury laws that restrict the availability of credit also help reduce problematic debt by
aiding uniformed borrowers, incapacitated borrowers, borrowers who are high risk, and
others. Id. at 171. Additionally, even though usury laws discourage competition, the
companies that usury laws prevent from entering the marketplace are those who would
seek to exploit borrowers, and thus consumer protection increases. See Drysdale & Keest,
supra note 6, at 663. Furthermore, from an economic perspective, usury laws help
counterbalance the risky behavior that providing welfare in a free market system creates
by discouraging people from taking unwise risks. See Eric A. Posner, Contract Law in the
Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related
Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 283, 285 (1995). Some
restrictions on the free market are an appropriate way of dealing with the risk-taking
incentives of a welfare system. Id. at 286. As Posner explains:
Because welfare opportunism and welfare circumvention take the form of high-
risk credit activity, the state should enact laws that restrict such activity.
Restrictive contract doctrines, such as usury laws, perform this function. By
allowing debtors to escape from high-interest credit contracts, they force
creditors to withdraw such contracts from the market, denying the debtors the
opportunity to obtain high-risk credit in the first place.
Id. at 286-87.
243. See supra Parts I.C.2, l.D.2.
244. See supra Part I.C.
245. See supra Parts I.A-B, I.C.3, 1I.
246. See supra Part III.B.
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